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Picketing constitutes one of the forms of pressure generally associated with labour disputes and particularly strikes. The term «picke-ting» is ancient. Originally, it was used in connection with military activités, describing a party of sentinels or an outlying post.
1 The earliest use of the term in légal literature has been traced to the case of Regina v. Druitt 2 in 1867, but the actions which it encompasses hâve been known to the law for a much longer period. 3 Since the term is not a légal one, its meaning must be derived from popular usage. The following passage from the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, cited by Finkelman, provides an explanation of what picketing connotes: 4 «The principal method employed to prevent strike breaking is that of picketing by strikers or their représentatives at or near the entrance to the place of employment. » Thus picketing consists of the présence of one or more persons with or without placards, generally at the premises of the employer during a labour conflict. This de vice is employed for any one or more of the following purposes : to inform those unaware of the fact that a strike is in progress ; to persuade workers to join the strike ; to discourage or prevent the public from doing business with the «struck» establishment, or to urge non-unionized workers to join the union.
Although picketing is a relatively common and familiar occurence, its légal status poses a problem. There is no référence whatsoever to picketing in the Québec Labour Code or in any other Québec law. The Canadian Labour Code provides no solution since this code also does not mention the term.
At présent, the only Canadian province which has any législation dealing with the subject is British Columbia. The work «picket» appears in the Labour Code of British Columbia, 1974 c. 87 , and is defined in S. 1 in the following manner: «Picket or «picketing» means watching and besetting, or attending at or near an employer's place of business, opérations or employment for the purpose of persuading or attempting to persuade anyone not to: i) enter that employer's place of business, opérations or employment; or ii) deal in or handle the products of that employer ; and iii) do business with that employer, and any similar act at such place that has an équivalent purpose.» This définition confines and limits picketing in terms of place, that is, at or near any employer's place of business; and in terms of purpose, that is, of persuading or attempting to persuade anyone not to enter that employer's place of business, opérations, or employment.
With the exception of British Columbia, due to the absence of any other législation on picketing, ail other provinces must fall back on the Criminal Code, since it is the only law which deals with the activity without, however, specifically using the term.
Article 381 of the Criminal Code states in part:
1. «Everyone who, wrongfully and without lawful authority, for the purpose of compelling another person to abstain from doing anything that he has a lawful right to do, or to do anything that he has a lawful right to abstain from doing... f) besets or watches the dwelling house or place where that person résides, works, carries on business or happens to be, or... is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction. 2. A person who attends at or near or approaches a dwelling house or place for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating information does not watch or beset within the meaning of this section. » Although the words «watches» and «besets» are not defined by this article, it has been recognized and accepted that they refer to the activity known as picketing. Thus, because of the exception established by paragraph 2 of article 381, picketing an establishment for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information does not constitute an offence.
The Criminal Code implicity defines and permits picketing. It does not, however, indicate to what extent this conduct is permissible. Neither the limits nor the effects are codified.
Picketing may serve various purposes. It may vary as to its form and take place during différent occasions. For example, picketing may consist solely of a few persons quietly walking back and forth carrying placards stating their grievances. However, can picketers verbally assault others in their attemts to persuade them of their cause and can they go as far as resorting to physical violence ? Just how much of the foregoing can a picket carry out ?
The purpose of this paper is to analyse this problem. More specifically, the authors will attempt, by means of «jurisprudence» in Québec, to détermine the conditions and circumstances which render picketing légal or illégal. Within this context, picketing will be examined from the point of view of object, form and occasion. In addition, the sanction of picketing will be presented, followed by a critique of the subject.
LEGAL PICKETING Historical Perspective :
In the absence of spécifie législation on picketing, freedom of speech could well constitute a légal basis for picketing. For example, the First Amendment to the American Constitution states that Congress cannot make any law which would abridge the freedom of speech or the right of people to peaceably assemble. While this principle has been recognized by the courts as a basis for picketing in the United States, the same cannot be said of Canada. In effect, there exists no équivalent statute to the First Amendment in our fédéral or provincial laws. In contrast, the right to picket in Canada developed initiaily through the courts' interprétation of British cases and later through an interprétation of what is now section 381(2) of the Criminal Code.
In England, during the 19th century, the law and the courts were consistently anti-labour. In fact, up until 1871, ail organized labour activity constituted a « criminal conspiracy ».
In 1871, législation in England began to be directed towards improving the existing imbalance between labour and management. The Trade Union Act 4 of 1871 established that the doctrine of conspiracy in the restraint of trade no longer applied to trade unions. Labour opposed this bill maintaining that the gênerai provisions applicable specifically to trade unions should apply to the community at large. This protest resulted in separating the criminal provisions from those legalizing trade unions. , the «peaceful picketing» clause was not included. Watching and besetting became an offence, and thus trade unionists who picketed during the course of a strike faced possible criminal prosecution for this activity.
Labour strenuously protested the omission of the «peaceful Picketing » section and demanded that the privilège of peaceful picketing be restored to them. The government finally ceded to their demands and amended the Criminal Code 12 in 1934 so that according to Section 501, a person who attends a place for the purpose solely to obtain or give information does not commit the offence of intimidation by «watching and besetting». Article 381(2) which reproduces the 1934 amendment thus offers strikers protection from criminal prosecution for picketing in order to obtain or communicate information.
While the 1934 amendment established that picketing for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information was légal, the question lay in determining whether peaceful picketing, having the aim of persuading others not to work during a labour dispute was a tortious act enabling an employer to sue for damages and to take an action for injunction. 
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The court, however, held that picketing constituted a common law nuisance. In reaching the dé-cision that watching and besetting was a common law nuisance, section 7 of the said Act was interpreted to mean that: 17 «the only case in which watching or beseting is allowed, or, in other words, is not unlawful, is that mentioned in the proviso at the end of the section -namely, where the attending at or near the house... or works... is in order merely to obtain or communicate information. Attending in order to persuade is not within the proviso. » Both Lindley, M. R., and Chitty, L. J., maintained that to watch or beset a man's house with the view to compel him to carry out or not carry out an activity was a wrongful act unless there was reasonable justification since such conduct interfères with the comfort and enjoyment of the «house beset».
In the case of Ward, Lock, ls an opposing point of view was taken. The défendant union placed its members around the plaintiff s business to persuade Ward, Lock's employées to join the union and cease working for their employer. Their object was to compel the plaintiff to employ union men only. An action was taken for damages and for an injunction to restrain the picketers from inducing breaches of contract, committing nuisance and watching and besetting. The court interpreted the words « wrongful and without légal authority » of section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 19 in a différent manner from the previous case. Hère, the court decided that the phrase «wrongful and without légal authority» did not apply to the word compel. They only added a criminal remedy to acts for which there was already a civil remedy. Judge Moulton stated: 20 «I cannot see that this section affects or is intended to affect civil rights or civil remédies. It legalizes nothing, and it renders nothing wrongful that was not so before. » The judge added: 21 «The restriction that the acts referred to must in themselves be at least civil torts is plainly expressed by the présence of the words «wrongfully» which applies equally to ail classes. Given this interprétation, the picketing was not found to be an offence within s. 7 of the Act and, therefore, did not constitute a common law nuisance.
In England, the two conflicting décisions were resolved by the Trade Disputes Act 22 of 1906. Specifically, section 2 of the Act assured workers of the right to picket peacefully. The purpose of picketing was not only for the purpose of obtaining or communicating information but also for the purpose of peacefully persuading others to work or abstain from working. There is, however, no équivalent to this section in Canadian législation. 
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Following a breakdown in contract negotiations, a trade union, certified as the bargaining agent of the employées in one of the employer's restaurants, set up a picket line in front of ail the employer's restaurants. The picketers paraded with placards which truthfully stated that the employer had no agreements with the union. On appeal from a décision directing that the picketing be enjoined, the court held that the picketing did not constitute a nuisance. . Section 3 of this Act not only absolves everyone from liability for communicating to any workman, artisan, labourer, employée or person, facts respecting employment but also removes liability for «persuading or endeavouring to persuade by fair or reasonable argument».
32 Thus the court held that the manner of picketing was lawful according to both criminal law and civil law.
Although this case did not define with any appréciable précision the limits of peaceful picketing, it did détermine that section 501 permitted this activity. Furthermore, the judgment established that picketing could go beyond obtaining or giving information, as set out in the section: picketing could be carried out in the form of peaceful persuasion. In this sensé, Aristocratie Restaurants 33 is a landmark décision.
Présent Status:
Notwithstanding the absence of a formai définition of picketing in our laws, the doctrine and the courts 34 hâve followed the précèdent set by Aristocratie Restaurants
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, and hâve continued to define peaceful picketing on the basis of section 381(2) of the Criminal Code. In sum, this section has been interpreted and has become accepted as providing the légal basis for peaceful picketing.
It is now an accepted principle, that workers hâve the right to picket for the purpose of obtaining and giving information and more specifically to advise and urge other workers to join a union or not to work. However, in achieving their aims, it is évident that picketers must respect the conditions established by the courts in order for the Act to remain lawful. Thèse conditions deal with the form, object and occasion of a picket line.
ILLEGAL PICKETING Causes

Form
Lord Lindley, in Quinn v. Leathem 36 declared that a «combina-tion not to work is one thing and is lawful. A combination to prevent others from working by annoying them if they do is a very différent thing and is prima facie unlawful». 37 Similarly, in the case of Canadian Gypsum Co. Ltd. v. C.S.N. 38 the court declared that a union and its members cannot take the law into their own hands to force an individual to stop working. According to this interprétation, the right to picket must, like any other right, be exercised so as not to interfère with the rights of others.
Thèse judgments thus maintain that picketing which prevents other workers from entering their place of work is illégal. This illegality may take a number of différent forms. « même une grève légale ne peut justifier un piquet illégal où l'on emploie l'intimidation, la violence, les menaces, la coercition... » It is clear that the right to picket does not confer on picketers the right, through intimidation or violence, to prevent others from working. This principle is not only applied objectively but it also may be applied subjectively. The courts look beyond the actions of the picketers in a given situation. In other words, they look beyond the mère existence of intimidation or violence. In The Foundation Company of Canada Ltd. and International Fibre Board Ltd. v. The Building and Construction Trades Council of Hull & District and other, 43,  it was established that the mère existence of a picket line, formerly intimidating and violent, would still serve as a constant reminder of past punishments and miseries, and of possible présent and mostly probable future retaliation.
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Picketing was therefore declared illégal, albeit devoid of violence and intimidation. Thus, if any picket line, at a certain point in its existence, becomes violent and intimidating, it can be argued, in light of the 37 Ibid., note 45, p. 538. Ibid., p. 22. above judgment, that the picket will forever be illégal since it serves as a constant reminder of this past activity. Such a criterion is not only subjective, conferring wide discretionary power to the judiciary, but also is highly arbitrary, serving to nullify the légal right to picket since it assumes a priori that there will be violence.
Obstruction
Independent of the question of violence and intimidation, if access to the picketed premises is blocked by the picketers, such an act is wrongful and without lawful authority. The problem lies in determining at what point the access is considered to be blocked. There seems to be little doubt as to the illegality of picketing when workers attempt to enter and are prevented from doing so (without the occurrence of violence of intimidation). 45 Thus, any situation where a person wants to enter the picketed premises, and where such person is prevented from doing so, the picketing must be declared illégal. Consistent with this principle, the courts hâve condemned the practice of certain unions of establishing a «Pass System». Under this system, the union décides whom it will allow to cross the picket line, and issues passes to them. By implication, and in fact, any other operson is not allowed to enter. 46 If no concrète obstruction exists, the question of the legality of the picket line is far more complex. Can the picketing be illégal if there exists no interférence with any person attempting to pass through the picket line? In other words, if a person who of his own volition refuses to cross the picket line, is there an illegality? The courts seem reluctant to qualify picketing as illégal in such circumstances. In Nedco v. Clark and ail other members of Communication Workers of Canada, Local no. 4, 50 it was found that there were no grounds for restraining the lawful picketing of the respondent since the picketing did not interfère with any person passing on the sidewalk, with any customer or with any deliveries. Mr. Justice Culliton indicated that if any person refused to enter the picketed premises, they did so of their own will because they did not choose to cross a picket line. Hence their refusai to enter was not because of any obstruction preventing their entry to the building. From this and other judgments, 51 it is évident that when there has been no obstruction, but employées will not cross a picket line due to their personal convictions, the picketing is not considered by the courts to be unlawful. It is only when picketing is of a nature to prevent the owner, his représentatives or workers from peacefully reaching their place of work that it becomes an illégal act.
Mass Picketing.
A further considération in determining the legality of picketing is the number of people forming the picket line. Does the mère présence of a large mass of picketers constitue an illegality ? While in Lupovich v. Shane, 52 it is stated that the numbers must not exceed «what is reasonably necessary» 53 , this expression was not defined, thus leading to considérable ambiguity on this question. Does five, ten, fifteen, twenty, one hundred or one thousand picketers constitute a mass? Not only does this case not provide an answer but the number of permissible picketers has not been determined precisely in any case of «jurispru-dence». Admittedly, in the décision where picketing was held to be lé-gal, the numbers were small; for the most part, there were less than eight persons involved in the activity. However, the question as to what constitutes a mass still remains unanswered. It is therefore left to the discrétion of the courts, according to the facts of each case.
Ri g ht to Property
The right to one's property imposes a further limitation upon picketing. Even peaceful picketing, when it infringes upon private property is considered to be an unlawful act: that of trespass. This interprétation is récent. The courts hâve not always viewed the right to property as absolute. The following cases illustrate the controversy that has surrounded this question which was resolved by the Suprême Court décision oîHarrison v. Carswell. 54 In Grosvenor Park Shopping Centre Ltd. v. Waloshin, 55 a shopping centre owner instituted an action in trespass and by means of an injunction attempted to restrain his tenant's employées from picketing on the sidewalks adjacent to the store premises during a légal strike. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal rejected the respondent's action. Their décision was based on the fact that since the owner has extended an unrestricted invitation to the public to enter upon the premises, the respondent no longer had exclusive possession.
However, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Regina v. Pet ers 56 rejected the idea that an owner who invited the public onto his premises thereby lost the right to maintain an action in trespass.
51 Sasso Disposai Ltd. v. Webster, (1976) This décision was appealed to the Suprême Court of Canada which, when faced with two conflicting Court of Appeal judgments, adopted the position of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
The controversy as to whether or not an owner who has extended an unrestricted invitation to the public, exercises control over his property to the exclusion of other persons was finally resolved in the Carswell 57 case. In this judgment, the respondent Carswell, who was an employée of a tenant in a shopping centre, peacefully picketed the premises of her employer while participating in a légal strike. The picketing which was exercised directly in front of the struck premises was on private property. The respondent was informed by the owner of the shopping centre that picketing was not permitted in any area of the shopping centre and was advised to move to a public sidewalk, some distance away. Carswell's refusai to leave the premises and to cease picketing resulted in four charges against her under the Petty Trespasses Act.
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In reaching their décision, the Suprême Court rejected a technique commonly used by American Courts known as the « balancing of interest», 59 which in this instance would require the Court to weigh and détermine the respective values to society of the right to property and the right to picket. The Court refused to view the issue in terms of this conflict, claiming that such an approach would raise difficult political and social issues, the considération of which could be resolved only in an arbitrary manner and embody personal, économie and social beliefs. Hence, the Court held that the owner of a shopping centre had sufficient control or possession of the common areas, notwithstanding the unrestricted invitation to the public to enter upon the premises, to enable him to invoke the remedy of trespass. Judge Dickson who delivered the majority décision stated: 60 « Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence has traditionally recognized, as a fundamental freedom, the right of the individual to the enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived thereof, or any interest therein, save by due process of law. The Législature of Manitoba has declared in The Petty Trespass Act that any person who trespasses upon land, the property of another, upon or through which has been requested by the owner not to enter, is guilty of an offence. » In Québec, the Courts hâve based the «right of property» on both the Civil Code (art. 399 and 406) and the Criminal Code (art. 501).
61 It appears from an interprétation of thèse articles and certain provincial Acts, 62 that peaceful picketing will not be tolerated when it infringes 57 Supra, note 54. upon private property. Therefore, persons engaged in picketing cannot carry out their activity on the personal property of their employer, nor in any way damage his property. It follows that in order to constitute a légal activity, the picketing must take place on public grounds.
Objevt.
Picketing, apart from being illégal on the basis of its form, may also be rendered illégal by its object. Object for purposes of this study, signifies intent or purpose. As Viscount Simon stated in the case of Crofter Hand-Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd. v. Vertch : 63 « The rest is not what is the natural resuit to the plaintiffs of such combined action, or what is the resulting damage which the défen-dants realize or should realize will follow, but what is in truth the object in the minds of the combiners when they acted as they did. It is not conséquence that matters, but purpose.» The principle will be analyzed in two separate sections. First, we will deal with the gênerai principle of scheming to injure the opérations of a company, and in a further section, we will deal with this notion relative to the question of placards (see section on placards relative to true statements).
Scheming to Injure
Picketing will be légal if the picketers' intent is to promote the interests of the union, but it will be illégal if their intent is to injure the interests of the employer. This distinction has been frequently cited by the Québec Courts. 64 In Seafarers' International Union of Canada v. Upper Lakes Shipping Limited, 6S members of the Seafarers' Union picketed the premises of their former employer, Upper Lakes Shipping. The évidence, as cited by the court, established that tug-boat crews refused to tow respondent's vessels; that truckers, members of a labour union, refused to carry cargo from thèse vessels; and that a party of three crew-members from one of thèse vessels were attacked in the street by seven men. On the basis of thèse incidents, the court reasoned that the picketing was part of a scheme to prevent the carrying on of respondent's business.
It is apparent that the courts hâve further restricted picketing by creating a subjective criterion. Not only must picketing be légal according to its form (subject to the objective criteria cited previously) but it must also be légal according to its object. Thus picketing carried out in a peaceful manner, but with the object of injuring the employer's business will be illégal. We hâve seen, however, that the détermination of what constitutes intent to injure the interests of the employer and intent to promote interests of the union is not easily distinguished. This naturally has the effect of leaving a great deal of discrétion to the courts. 
Placards. a) Intimidating placards
The courts hâve ruled that picketing is illégal if placards or other literature is intimidating. This opinion was clearly expressed in the case of Hurtig v. Reiss. bt While the expression «intimidation» has not been defined in the context of placards, we must assume that any placard which inspires a legitimate fear would fall into this category. In the Rother 67 case, the Court of Appeal stated that if things done, or words spoken or written excite fear or a reasonable appréhension of fear or danger and so influence those for whom it is intended so as to prevent them from freely doing what their désire and the law permits, they may be so restrained. 68 Thus, it would appear that the mère présence of an intimidating placard would render the picketing illégal independent of its peaceful manner.
b) Defamatory Placards
Black's Law Dictionary defines defamation as: 69 «the offence of injuring a person's character, famé, or réputation by false and malicious statements. » In gênerai, the question of defamation arises in a civil suit for damages. This principle, however, can also be raised as a cause for an illégal picket.
False Statements
In order for defamation to render picketing illégal, there must be proof of a fault. The flrst characteristic «est celle où le défendeur, sciemment de mauvaise foi, avec l'intention de nuire, s'attaque à la ré-putation de la victime et cherche à le ridiculiser ou l'humilier, à l'exposer à la haine ou au mépris du public ou d'un groupe». 70 Secondly, defamation can also exist without the will of bad faith, provided that the information is false and the réputation is damaged. Thus, where picketers knowingly or unknowingly damage the réputation of a « moral or physical person» through false information contained on placards, the picketing becomes illégal.
We must note, however, that statements on placards thaï: are partially misleading or false, do not necessarily create illégal picketing. In Ritz Carlton Hôtel Co. Ltd. v that case may not hâve been literally true, they were not patently false considering the circumstances and the limitation of space in making propaganda by placard. This has raised doubt as to what constitutes a «patently false» and «literally true» statement. Nowhere in this case or in subséquent case hâve thèse terms been defined. It thus foliows that the Courts are again left with wide discrétion in adjudicating upon this question.
True Statement s
Defamation can occur even if placards paraded are true. Such is the case of a placard which has as its only goal to harm the victim. In the case of Hurtig v. Reiss, 72 the veracity of thèse statements on the placards was upheld by the court. Despite this conclusion, however, the court held that the parades in which thèse placards were carried, and the appeal to the public not to buy the employer's goods indicated that their purpose was to injure his business. An injunction was thus issued forbidding the carrying or displaying of placards or posters which would tend to injure the plaintiff s business.
Further illustrations of this principle can be found in the cases of Allied Amusements v. Reaney 73
and/?, v. Baldassari.
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In contrast, placards with truthful statements paraded with the intent of conveying information to the public are légal. In the case ofBellemare Datsun v. Automobile Protection, 75 the respondent, having discovered that the plaintiff sold 1972 cars as 1973 cars, picketed the premises of said plaintiff for purposes of informing and warning the public of this practice. The court judged the picketing to be légal, contending that the intent of the respondent was not to harm the plaintiff s business by reducing sales, but on the other hand to communicate information to the public.
In the case of Wasserman v. Sopman, 76 picketing was found to be légal where members of a firm of poultry commissioners were, in a peaceful fashion, parading signs truthfully stating that such dealer refuses to deal with the picketers' firm. In this judgment, there was no intention on the part of the picketers to injure the plaintiff s, and consequently the picketing was légal. The court further established that even if the effect of the placards is to engender loss of trade, an injunction cannot be issued.
We can thus conclude that picketing is légal when : 1) information conveyed on the placards is truthful, and 2) the picketers do not hâve the intent to injure the plaintiff s business. The prime considération in the legality of a picket line is the intent of the picketers and not the actual effects that their activities may engender. 
Occasion
Illégal Sîrikes
We hâve seen from the foregoing that when any one of a number of illégal acts hâve been committed in the «form» or the «object» of picketing, the activity consequently becomes illégal. A problem anses in instances where the picketing is in itself peaceful (i.e. not illégal in terms of its «form» or «object») but is carried out to further an illégal strike. The question as to the legality of the picketing under thèse circumstances has arisen in numerous décisions during the past three dé-cades. A review of the «jurisprudence» reveals confîicting positions taken by the courts over the years.
During the 1950's, the tendency of the courts was to view peaceful picketing as lawful, whether or not the strike was légal.
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This attitude with regard to peaceful picketing was reversed in the early 1960's by a Suprême Court judgment in Gagnon et al. v. Foundation Maritime Limited. 78 In this case, officiais of the company refused a request made by union organizers for récognition of their union since they had not been certified as required under the Labour Relations Act.
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Subséquent to the company's décision, a picket Une appeared which had the effect of bringing the opérations of the company to a standstill. The New Brunswick Suprême Court issued an injunction against the picketing, despite its peaceful nature, on the grounds that as the strike itself was unlawful, the picketing was unlawful. This décision was maintained by the Suprême Court.
The notion derived from the Gagnon* 0 case, that the illegality of a strike necessarily renders the concomitant picketing illégal has, with few exceptions, been accepted by the courts up to the présent time. A few décisions in the latter period of the i960's had been interpreted as a renewed reversai of the position of the courts. 82 For example, in the case of Arden Fur Corp. v. Montréal Fur Workers Union 9, 3 , the company requested that the court grant an injunction to stop the picketing which took place in front of the business premises. Mr. Justice Petticombe did not find the conduct of the picketers to be reprehensible. He reffered to be décision of Hyde Park Clothes Ltd., 84 where Mr. Justice Challies indicated that peaceful picketing should not be enjoined even when it is in support of an illégal strike. His approval of the principle is évident since he applied this reasoning to the présent case in which no strike existed and dismissed the application for an injunction.
Further décisions, however, indicate that this favourable attitude towards peaceful picketing accompanying an illégal strike did not continue. The interruption of the tendency established in the early i960's was only temporary. Evidence of this may be found from Judge Deslaurier's statement at p. 40 in Imprimerie Montréal, «Si l'arrêt de travail constitue une grève et si cette grève est exécu-tée en violation des dispositions formelles de la loi, le tribunal est d'opinion que tout guet, même paisible, devient illégal à moins qu'il ne soit autorisé par une disposition législative édictée à cette fin. »
In the décision of Thomson Electrical Works v. McGraw et al, the
défendants, who were engaged in picketing, were not members of a trade union. The Court stated that since the défendants were not carrying out a lawful union activity, they had no right to picket. The court came to a similar conclusion in Rudolf Martin Enterprises Ltd. and Laukkanen Construction Ltd. v. International Union of Elevât or Constructors, 97 and Masco Construction Ltd. v. International Union of Operating Engineers. 88 It is évident that the Courts hâve considered picketing, even when peaceful, to be illégal where it is carried out in support of an illégal strike or where this activity has taken place in violation of any relevant législation. Given that the latter judgments cited are récent, it may be concluded that this is the présent position of the judiciary. 
General notions
The injunction is the common sanction against illégal picketing. While the illegality of picketing can also resuit in criminal proceedings and civil suits, we will focus our attention on the question of injunctions.
Injunctions are divided into two separate catégories. First, injunctions are either restrictive or mandatory. This refers to the nature of the order issued pursuant to the pétition. The second classification comprises injunctions which are either interlocutory or final. This category refers to the mode and timing of the pétition.
The most common form of injunction, the restrictive injunction, orders a party (the défendant) not to do or to cease doing a certain act. It is this injunction which commonly sanctions illégal picketing. On the other hand, the mandatory injunction orders the respondent to do or perforai a certain act. Article 751 CCP states that the mandatory injunction is only available « in cases which admit of it », namely those instances where spécifie performance is the appropriate solution.
Injunctions are also classified according to the mode and timing of the pétition. The interlocutory injunction may be obtained either at the beginning of the principal action or at any time during the suit (article 752). Its primary purpose is to préserve the status quo until judgment on the principal action has been rendered. Article 753 states that the interlocutory injunction must be applied for by a motion to the court supported by an affidavit affirming the truth of the facts alleged. Furthermore, it must be served upon the opposite party with mention of the date when it will be presented.
The intérim interlocutory injunction is an exceptional form of the interlocutory injunction. While obtained in the same manner as the ordinary interlocutory, it is not served on the opposite party, thereby denying the said party the opportunity of refuting the allégations contained therein. Moreover, article 753 restricts the use of the intérim injunction to cases of extrême urgency. Consistent with this principle, the court in Tricot Somerset Inc. V. Le Syndicat Catholique* 9 considered «qu'il était donc urgent et impérieux de décerner une injonction intérimaire de façon à mettre fin au piquetage». Finally, we must note that the intérim injunctions cannot be granted for a period exceeding ten days and, in fact, is rarely granted for more than five days.
The interlocutory injunction, whether ordinary or intérim, is governed by the criteria set down in article 752, par. 2., C.C.P. This article states that injunctions may be granted on an interlocutory basis only if the petitioner establishes a prima facie case in his favour, and is suffering serious or irréparable damage. In applying thèse criteria, the courts use what is known as the «balance of inconvenience» theory. Supra, note 45, p. 102. Thus, an injunction will be granted only when the alleged injury to the petitioner is greater than the préjudice to the respondent should the injunction be accorded. The court must in effect balance or weigh the inconvenience that each party might suffer depending on whether the injunction is granted or not.
The final injunction, on the other hand, is sought as the conclusion of the principal action. The procédural requirements governing such an injunction are similar to those governing ail principal actions where the fault alleged is outlined in the writ and served on the opposite party. The court, in such cases, is not concerned with prima facie rights. Instead it will restrict itself to the considération of real rights in deciding whether to grant or refuse an injunction. We must note that in determining the merits of an application for a final injunction, the court will not use the criteria outlined in article 752, C.C.P. relative to the granting of an interlocutory injunction.
In labour disputes, the injunction is most frequently used to restrain unlawful picketing by strikers or others at the employer's or someone else's place of business. Previously, we hâve seen that picketing may be illégal because of its form, object or occasion. In any of thèse instances where picketing is illégal, the petitioner may apply for an interlocutory or intérim injunction even before the merits of the case hâve been judged. Where an act is held to be illégal, an injunction generally will be granted. We must note, however, that the question of whether to hâve an injunction and what is in fact enjoined by an injunction is the décision of the presiding judge. Finally, we must add that if picketing is declared légal, no injunctions will be granted, be it interlocutory, intérim or final.
Criticisms Numerous criticisms hâve been levied against the injunction, particularly of the interlocutory type. For example, Carrothers contends that it is granted in language broader than the circumstances warrant, and in légal phraseology often incompréhensible to the laymen. 90 Other complaints are cited by Mr. Justice Laskin in «The Labour Injunction in Canada.» 91 Thèse include the far-reaching terms of the order creating fear in those who are enjoinded, the circumscription of union activity beyond the needs of the particular case and the prejudgment of the issues involved in a labour dispute. It also has been found that injunctions produce resentment and antagonism that frequently resuit in acts of violence which did not exist prior to the injunction order.
The most common criticism of the injunction is that it is generally granted ex parte. In this case, the party petitioning the court for an injunction files affidavits containing allégations of fact which naturally is prejudiced in his favour. The déponents are not cross-examined nor is 90 A.W.R. CARROTHERS, The Labour Injunction in British Columbia, Toronto, 1956, p. 202 and 209. 91 (1937) 15, Can. B. Rev., [270] [271] [272] [273] their évidence, often on information and belief, tested in any other way. Based upon this évidence, the judge décides whether or not the petitioner has a prima facie case required for the issuance of an injunction. The merits of the case are not considered at this point. The opposing party not only is absent but is not notified of the hearing and thus has no possibility of refuting the allégations. It follows that the party enjoined is not even aware of the existence of the court order until it is served upon him.
In our estimate, this procédure violâtes the rules of natural justice, specifically that of the rule «audi alteram partem» since the effect of the ex parte injunction is to deprive one of the parties of his rights without having had the opportunity to be heard by the court. It is impossible for the court to claim that its judgments are made objectively when only one of the parties to the dispute has been presented.
Furthermore, since it is normal for the employer to présent arguments in his own favour and interpret the facts to his advantage, and since the union is not présent at the hearing, it is not surprising that ex parte injunctions are granted so readily. Thus, the fact of not taking the other party into account not only violâtes a fundamental right, the right to be heard, but results in a préjudice in favour of the petitioner.
It may be argued that since the issues are determined at trial, there is no need for labour to be heard at the time of the ex parte hearing. 92 In actual fact, the majority of cases never reach trial on the merits. Viewed in this light, any claim that considération is given to unions' interests appears to be unfounded.
Others défend the injunction on the grounds that it may be appealed. Given this recourse, it is argued that in cases where the injunction was granted without justification it will be dismissed and damages awarded. In reality, however, the removal of an injunction at a later date is of little value. The décision in Canuk Lines Limited v. Seafarer's International Union of Canada and others 93 clearly illustrâtes this point. In this case, Canuk, owner of the S.S. Canuk, fired ail his crew members in Hong Kong in order to fiée himself of a collective agreement he had signed with the Seafarer's International Union (S.LU.). According to the agreement the ship was to be manned by a crew composed of Canadians who were members of the S.LU. He then hired a new crew composed entirely of Hong Kong nationals at rates considerably lower than those in effect in Canada. In 1962, when the S.S. Canuk Trader arrived in Montréal, the S.I.U. established a picket Une to publicize the fact that its members had been fired. Because of the refusai of the stevedores of the International Longshoremen's Association to cross the picket Une, Canuk petitioned for and obtained first an intérim injunction and then an interlocutory injunction in August, 1962 . On Octobre 31, 1963 , more than a year from the time the intérim injunction was issued, the court decided that the damages suf- fered by Canuk were not caused by the Union simply because the Longshoremen respected the picket line. The court held that the S.LU. had the right to establish a picket line to protect the interests of its members since the employer had broken the collective agreement. While it was decided that a picket line could be established legally, this proved to be little consolation for the union. In effect, by the time the judgment was rendered, the ship had long departed. In light of this fact, it is évident that the re-establishment of a picket line would hâve had no purpose. In addition, it must be noted that the S.LU. dit not obtain any damages for the préjudice incurred by the issuance of the injunction.
The injunction is not the only recourse available to the employer for a breach of contract, infringement upon property or a criminal charge. However, during the course of a labour-management struggle a criminal suit or other civil actions are in no way as effective as the injunction. Thèse procédures can drag on for months if not years. In addition, they do not prevent the récurrence of picketing or other union acts. The injunction, on other hand, provides management with immé-diate results and forces compliance with the court order. Thus the injunction is used frequently by management rather than alternate légal procédures. If we recognize that a certain equilibrium must exist between labour and management during a labour dispute, then the position of the workers is seriously affected when the right of picketing has been removed. When a court order is issued to hait picketing, it not only compromises the union's position for the duration of the labour dispute but it has the effect of eliminating one of the essential weapons that workers possess in the dispute. The tactic of having picketing enjoined demoralizes the workers and breaks their solidarity. In fact, once an injunction is granted enjoining picketing, it can effectively hâve the conséquence of breaking a strike. Thus, this tactic successfully produces a destabilizing effect in the relations between the two parties.
In light of the above, if the balance of inconvenience test is to be applied strictly, the injurious effect of the injunction on labour's activités must be considered to the same extent as the irréparable injury to management. Given the frequency with which injunctions are granted to the employer this does not seem to be the case at présent. It appears évident that some changes are warranted in order to arrive at a solution which would be acceptable and just to both parties.
CONCLUSION
It has been recognized by law that workers hâve the right to group themselves into associations; to form and negotiate collective agreements and to engage in strikes. Because of the growing importance of the labour movement in the past century, it became essential to legislate on thèse and other areas of labour relations. Hence, the Labour Code indicates the requirements which must be met in order for the various rights of labour to be recognized. Therefore, it is illogical that picketing, a common élément in labour disputes, has not been codified in our laws. The absence of such législative provision has left the judiciary with an unwarranted degree of discrétion. The Courts thus détermine the legality of a picket on purely subjective criteria. This was underlined in the cited cases of mass picketing, obstruction and even of violence. In the latter situation, in the case of Foundation, the mère existence of a picket line served as a constant reminder of past threats. Thus, while the picketing was peaceful in this case, the Court's interprétation rendered the picketing illégal because of some imagined appréhension. Furthermore, we may add that apart from the détermina-tion of the legality of the picket, the Courts hâve almost complète discrétion in deciding upon the ultimate sanction of such illegality -the injunction.
Although a certain élément of discrétion is exercised in any judicial décision, thèse décisions are based on the interprétation of an existing law. Such is not the case in the realm of picketing. Given the absence of any législative authority, the Courts set their own guidelines. Their discrétion is thus absolute. The authors feel that this situation is untenable.
Moreover, the judiciary has usurped the rôle of the legislator in this domain. In effect, when a judge déclares the illegality of picketing and issues an injunction, he becomes the private legislator of one party against the other. Thus, we find the anomaly of one individual concurrent^ exercising two powers, that is the législative and the judiciary.
Finally, we feel that the judicial branch is unable to deal impartially with the issue of picketing. Because of his background, the judge will likely be found to share the same values as the employer, and will be more disposed to support the values that uphold thèse rights. The folio wing statement by Lord Scrutton in an address delivered before the University Law Society, although made more than five décades ago has some pertinence even today : 94 «I am not speaking of conscious impartiality ; but the habits you are trained in, the people with whom you mix, lead you to having a certain class of ideas of such a nature that when you hâve to deal with other ideas, you do not give as sound and accurate judgments as you would wish. This is one of the great difficulties at présent with Labour. Labour says : Where are your impartial judges ? They ail move in the same circle as the employers, and they are ail educated and nursed in the same ideas as the employers. How can a labour man or trade unionist get impartial justice? It is very difficult sometimes to be sure that you hâve put yourself into a thoroughly impartial position between two disputants, one of your own class and one not of your class. » What are the solutions to this complex issue? Proposais hâve ranged from a stricter application of the law to the total abolition of the use of injunctions in labour conflicts. adopts a rather conservative position with regard to the problem of labour disputes. While recognizing that certain abuses exist, he does not advocate curbing the use of the injunction or modifying the law. According to the author, the basic problem concerns the procédu-res by which it is obtained and the form that the order takes. His proposais therefore deal with both the form and the procédure of the injunction. For example, he suggests that affidavits on information and belief should be avoided except in cases of imperative need. Concerning ex parte injunctions, he urges that particular care should be taken to see that the qualifications of fairness and explicitness are met. Taken as a whole, his proposais amount to nothing more than a stricter application of the law while leaving the same discretionary powers to the judges. He concludes his critique and summary with the following statement : 96 « A number of the above suggestions are not rigid requirements of the law. But if they are followed it is submitted that it cannot be said with truth and justification that through the abuse of the injunctive process there is one law for management and another for labour. » The implication of this proposai is that if unions and management adhère to and obey the law ail injustice will be eliminated. The authors do not consider that his proposais alter the présent injustices or offer any concrète solutions to the labour-management problem.
At the other end of the spectrum, labour advocates the total abolition of the injunction in labour disputes. La Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux, for example, views the injunction as a weapon used by management to deprive labour of an effective means of retaliation. The following passage illustrâtes their reasoning for opposing the injunction: 97 «... On peut ajouter qu'une injonction joue contre les groupes qui, non seulement tentent de rétablir l'équilibre entre le pouvoir considérable, qui les tient et le pouvoir subordonné et insuffisant qui est leur lot, mais cherchent à réaliser pour eux-mêmes des choses d'une importance vitale: meilleurs salaires, sécurité d'emploi plus grande, moyens de défense contre les abus quotidiens de l'autorité dans l'entreprise, sécurité et hygiène au travail...» The total abolition of the injunction (against picketing), in our opinion, can only lead to discrimination toward management which would be as unjust as the présent use of injunctions is against labour. 95 Supra, note 90.
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Pour l'abolition de l'injonction dans les conflits de travail, La Confédération des Syndicats Nationaux: Montréal, le 8 mars, Réimpression et nouvelle Présenta-tion -Nov. 1960, p. 5-7. Therefore, the foliowing solutions are more acceptable to the authors : 1. Picketing must be codified not only in terms of its définition but in ail aspects ; for example, the number of picketers permitted at each entrance of the picketed premises, the permissible communication on placards, a clear-cut définition of intimidation and obstruction, and so on. Moreover, we recommend the formation of an administrative mechanism to détermine the norms and application of thèse législative criteria.
This type of législation would minimize the Court's présent discretionary powers while in no way negating the rights of labour to use what has become a most important weapon in labour disputes. 2. We recommend the establishment of a labour court composed of members of labour, management and the law. This composition would avoid the partiality that is said to exist among judges who identify with management rather than labour. In addition, the court would deal with ail aspects of labour disputes. We make this recommendation bearing in mind the existence of arbitration boards because we see the powers of the Labour Court being more extensive then those exercised by the labour arbitration boards. We suggest that the powers to granl injmictions in labour disputes be removed from the Superior Court and given to this Labour Court. The authors' prime objection to the injunction is due to the arbitrary manner in which they are issued, the possible partiality of the judges and the usurpation of the législative function rather than the injunction per se. It is suggested that injunctions can be permitted if précise législation as to their issuance is enacted, limiting injunctions to exceptional circumstances also precisely defined by law. This would hâve the effect of removing the présent judicial préjudice against picketers while at the same time acknowledging the rights of management. Needless to say, ex parte injunctions, in that they violate the fundamental right of one of the parties to be heard, must be abolished.
To sump up, it is évident that the whole area of picketing in its various manifestations should be reviewed by the législative and judicial authorities in order to produce a more équitable set of guidelines for both labour and management. In the absence of reform, the présent acrimony and uncertainty will continue unabated.
